OVERVIEW

The conditions described by Power Struggle would once have been considered appealing, rather than threatening. Over the past decade, we've seen a faster-than-expected transition away from petroleum, coupled with an increasing diversity of energy sources. But two major factors have turned global energy conditions into a real superthreat: the transition is stalled and incomplete, leading to chaotic uncertainty for both producers and consumers; and efforts to shoehorn the churning diversity of energy sources into the existing market and distribution infrastructure have effectively failed. In short, we're caught in a trap.

It's a peculiar sort of trap, however. Power Struggle offers an example of what complexity scientists refer to as a "circular mill" problem. In a circular mill, ants follow a scent trail, get confused, and begin to circle around a stationary object; the multitude of ants along the same trail reinforce the path, making it progressively less likely that the ants will break away. In the case of Power Struggle, broken market and infrastructure institutions are further weakened by seemingly rational near-term choices made by both energy producers and energy consumers--that is, just about all of us.

Power Struggle has a special place in the spectrum of superthreats. Of the five, it has the sharpest spike and decline over the course of our 25 year window; in some of the WorldRun simulations, it actually drops out before the survival horizon date (although because it has already done its damage, the survival horizon itself doesn't change appreciably). GEAS sees Power Struggle as a top target for influencing our survival: the faster we can get this superthreat under control, the less damage it can do. One WorldRun simulation of a rapid response to this superthreat alone extended the survival horizon to nearly 2070.

Power Struggle is well underway, and we've seen a variety of events of late that serve to strengthen the superthreat:

  • • A big global push to go nuclear has once again been stalled by the catastrophic power plant accident in China in 2013 as well as unresolved questions about how to handle nuclear waste, and the particular problem of weaponized waste.
  • • Russian efforts to turn methane caught leaking from Siberian permafrost into methanol have been repeatedly sabotaged.
    • • A coalition of European fueling station have owners refused to adopt American voltage and plug standards for electric vehicles, saying "it's another example
  • of American technological arrogance."
  • • In Brazil, a major shipment of soybeans destined for biofuel processing was hijacked. The government blamed Venezuela, but signs point to local food-not-fuel activists.
  • * Private jatropha farms in Saudi Arabia, which have been growing biofuel plants since 2005, have been nationalized by Saudi government, stopping all exports.

OIL CHAOS

Across the latter half of the 2010s, the price of petroleum has fluctuated wildly, from as low as €50/bbl or about $80/bbl in 2019 euros (roughly the same price as in 2006, accounting for inflation) to as high as €350/bbl or about $560/bbl, and then back, sometimes within just a few weeks. Speculation, peak oil calculations, unexpected discoveries, warfare, and (most critically) radical shifts in demand have rendered oil markets entirely unstable.

At a geopolitical level, this has meant the death knell for OPEC, as oil-producing countries have fought hard to maintain their share of a rapidly churning market. Inconsistent oil wealth has undermined the political stability of many former OPEC nations, such as Venezuela and Kuwait. Political scientists trace at least three active civil wars directly to rapid shifts in oil income; WorldRun/poli simulations suggest that we are likely to see a half-dozen more in the coming decade.

One of the key uncertainties surrounding demand comes from the resurgent biofuels industry and the intense competition between incompatible vehicle technologies. Broadly speaking, biofuel-based combustion vehicles dominate the developing and "leapfrog" nations, such as Brazil, China, and Russia. Electric and fuel cell vehicles dominate the post-industrial nations from Japan to the US to the EU as well as the (surprisingly) India. But even within these regions, there is turmoil over standards, as well as regular calls to return to petroleum-based transportation (typically when oil prices have dropped).

The result has been massive uncertainty in the market, with key actors (governments, auto companies, investors) clinging to old models out of a lack of a clear path forward.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Infrastructure proved to be particularly problematic for the auto manufacturing industries. Already on shaky ground after the rushed transition away from petroleum, global car makers such as Toyota, GM, and Daimler-Tesla discovered that they were now fighting over a much smaller and more fragmented, market. Local automakers have done relatively well, especially in India and China, but their attempts to move to global markets have uniformly failed.

Fragmented and inconsistent markets have played havoc with non-transportation energy, as well. Although climate scientists remain reluctant to blame the superstorm summer of 2014 solely on global warming, it served as a final wake-up call for efforts to "de-carbonize" the global economy. But even as the US, China, and other major emitters worked to shut down coal-fired power plants, it became painfully clear that few if any of the various non-carbon energy sources offered an easy, inexpensive replacement for massive centralized coal-fired generators.

Transitions to more distributed, decentralized energy systems required substantial investments in power grid reliability, in "smart meters," and especially in the power systems themselves. They also required what was often seen as radical shifts in policies and regulations. Economic constraints made such shifts difficult in some places, and government philosophy prohibited them in others. The new technologies, however, simply did not work well with 19th and 20th century distribution and control models. The result has been a stalemate, pushing us towards collapse.

POINTS OF IMPACT

It's no exaggeration to say that every institution, market, and community has been hit by this superthreat. Industries involved with mobility and energy production have been the biggest targets, but the follow-on effects from Power Struggle have destabilized education funding, healthcare, agricultural production, migratory patterns, environmental cleanup, and on and on. Some examples of especially hard-hit sectors include:

  • • Oil-exporting nations
  • • Coal industry
  • • Shipping and logistics
  • • Airlines
  • • Autoworkers
  • • Consumers

CONNECTIONS

The Power Struggle superthreat interacts with the four other superthreats in the following ways:

Quarantine: Energy costs, limitations on infrastructure, and increased demand for scientific research & development all limit resources available to fight pandemic. Disease disrupts workforce productivity, reducing available economic resources.

Ravenous: Conflicts over biofuels exacerbate conflicts over food, and vice-versa. High energy costs increase cost of agriculture, and the demands for natural gas for energy make fertilizer more expensive.

Outlaw Planet: Ongoing proliferation of attacks on power infrastructure, from production to distribution undermind community and national security. Energy-related conflicts increase money and motivation for griefing and disruption.

Generation Exile: Unpredictable population levels mean unpredictable demands on energy infrastructure, as well as on workforce availability. Energy conflicts and availability serve as a secondary driver for migration, but greatly reduce ease of movement.